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ABSTRACT 
According to Epicurus, philosophy’s sole task is to ensure the well-being of the soul. Human 
souls are often riddled with diseases; the most serious are the fear of the gods and the fear of 
death. Thus, the Epicureans offered several arguments designed to demonstrate that, for instance, 
“death is nothing to us,” and should therefore not be feared. Since their creation there has been 
much discussion, both in antiquity and by contemporary philosophers, about these arguments. In 
this thesis, I argue that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they necessarily 
adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience. The end result 
is that when we evaluate Epicurean philosophical arguments, we must do so in light of the audi-
ence for whom they were intended. 
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Studies on whether the arguments propounded by the Epicureans against the fear of death suc-
cessfully establish that “death is nothing to us” are numerous. Critics sometimes contend that the 
premises of these arguments do not support adequately the truth of their conclusions. Other times 
they claim that these arguments overlook obvious counterexamples, which leaves them open to 
seemingly crushing objections. While this may be the case, it is not a problem for the Epicureans 
or their arguments. In this thesis I argue that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-
relative; they necessarily adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended 
audience. Although I shall be chiefly concerned with those arguments marshaled against the fear 
of death, I intend for my thesis to apply to all Epicurean philosophical arguments. 
 In Part I, I argue for the patient-relativity thesis by drawing heavily from the treatises of 
first century Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara. Philodemus’ treatises provide valuable insight 
into the stochastic method of Epicurean psychagogues, and shed light on the τιθέναι πρὸ 
ὀµµάτων, to-set-before-the-eyes, therapeutic technique. These two aspects of Epicurean psycha-
gogy, alongside the instrumental value of the norms of rational discourse, are sufficient to 
demonstrate the validity of the patient-relativity thesis. But my thesis is not without controversy, 
and in Part II I treat at length two concerns. The first is about the “depth” of the medical analogy 
between philosophical psychagogy and empirical medicine; the second about the instrumental 
value placed on the norms of rational discourse. In Part III I put the patient-relativity thesis into 
practice. I first examine three arguments: Ep. Men. 124, DRN 3.832-42, and DRN 3.972-5. I 
identify their intended audience, and then explain why their creators, Epicurus and Lucretius re-
spectively, chose to deliver their arguments in the way they did, and how that makes them thera-
peutically effective. I then turn my attention to Philodemus’ On Death. Here I examine his 
2 
treatment of both the fear of death at sea, and the fear of premature death. My discussion is at 
times more complex in light of Philodemus’ insight into the intricacies of his patients’ psycholo-
gies. The end result is that when we assess the efficacy of the Epicurean’s philosophical argu-
ments, we must do so in the light of their intended audience, for whom they were designed.  
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PART I: The Importance of The Patient in Epicurean Psychagogy 
I.1 
Most people suffer from painful psychic diseases. According to the Epicureans, these diseases 
are rooted in vain and empty desires, which in turn are rooted in false beliefs about what is truly 
good and bad. It is primarily through philosophical argument that these false beliefs are uproot-
ed, and the soul returned to its original, healthy state. 
In addition to philosophical argument, the Epicureans have other tools in their “therapeu-
tic toolbox.” For instance, at the end of his letter to Menoeceus—a summary of the major Epicu-
rean ethical precepts—Epicurus urges Menoeceus to “practice these and related precepts by 
yourself, day and night, and with a like-minded friend.”1 From this we may infer that both con-
tinual practice of the precepts and one’s friends play an important role in a person’s therapy. 
Still, philosophical argument is the psychagogue’s primary tool.2 We might wonder, then, 
whether philosophical argumentation as practiced by the Epicureans is an effective method for 
uprooting false beliefs, and consequently removing a person’s fears and anxieties. Consider the 
famous Epicurean dictum: 
Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no perception, and what has no percep-
tion is nothing to us. (Kyria Doxai [KD] 2) 
 
Even if we grant Epicurus his atomism, and agree with Lucretius that “[a]s soon as a person is 
wrapped in the peaceful sleep of death...the body suffers no perceptible loss”,3 will this argument 
succeed in quelling a person’s fear and anxiety towards death? Probably not. Some scholars, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ep. Men. 135. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are the author’s own.  
2 For more on the classification of the Epicurean wise man as a “psychagogue” and his practice as “psychagogy,” 
see Glad 1995, 17ff. The Greek word ψυχαγωγέω, from which these two words derive, originally meant “to lead 
departed souls to the nether world,” but by Plato’s time had come to mean simply “guidance of the soul” (ibid., 18). 
3 De Rerum Natura (DRN) 3.211-15. All translations of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura are from Martin Ferguson 
Smith’s Hackett (2001) edition. 
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such as Thomas Nagel, contend that the argument’s premises do not establish the truth of its 
conclusion.4 There are many reasons to fear one’s death, e.g. it removes the opportunity for ex-
periencing further pleasures.5 The fact that I will not perceive anything when I am dead does lit-
tle to assuage my fears now.  
The two most-discussed Epicurean arguments against the fear of death—the “non-
perception” (ἀναισθησία) argument and the “non-identity” argument—conclude that death is not 
bad for anybody.6 This conclusion has lead many to believe that these arguments are intended to 
serve as a universal panacea for the fear of death, which leaves them open to the objection that 
they often fail. However, recent discussions about Philodemus of Gadara, a first century BCE 
Epicurean whose treatises are our best source for understanding the theories and practices asso-
ciated with Epicurean psychagogy, indicate that this objection misunderstands the Epicureans’ 
approach.7 In the ensuing discussion I bring to light three important aspects of Epicurean psy-
chagogy that I argue make their philosophical arguments patient-relative; they necessarily adapt 
themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience in light of their psy-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Nagel 1979, 1 – 10. 
5 In On Death Philodemus attempts to treat ten different reasons for fearing death: (1) the fear of premature death 
(cols. XII – XIX), (2) the fear that one’s enemies will prosper when one dies (cols. XIX – XX), (3) the fear that one 
will die childless (cols. XXII – XXV), (4) the fear that one will die in a foreign country (cols. XXV – XXVI), (5) the 
fear of not dying in battle (col. XXVIII), (6) the fear that when one dies one’s appearance will be poor (col. XXIX), 
(7) the fear that when one dies one’s body will not receive a proper burial (cols. XXX – XXXII), (8) the fear that 
one will die at sea (col. XXXII), (9) the fear that one will die from unjust condemnation (cols. XXXIII – XXXIV), 
and (10) the fear that after one dies one will no longer be remembered (cols. XXXV – XXXVII). 
6 These two arguments are often combined in the Epicurean literature (e.g. DRN 3.870ff). (For more on this way of 
classifying the Epicurean’s arguments, see Tsouna 2006, 87-8.) The non-perception argument concludes that, be-
cause all good and bad depends on perception, and because in death we (i.e., the compound of body and soul atoms) 
have dispersed (and therefore cannot perceive), death is nothing to us (e.g. KD 2 and Ep. Men. 124). The non-
identity argument, by contrast, concludes that because we are a combination of body and soul atoms, and because in 
death our body and soul atoms have dispersed and thus we no longer exist, that therefore death is nothing to us (e.g. 
Ep. Men. 125). For other interpretations of the two major Epicurean arguments against the fear of death, see Warren 
2004, 17-56 and O’Keefe 2010, 163-73. Readers may be well aware of a third argument, often referred to as the 
Symmetry Argument. I discuss this argument below, but at present I wish to note that I agree with Warren (2004) 
who argues that the Symmetry Argument is nothing more than a different presentation of the “non-perception” ar-
gument. Recently a fourth argument, called the “cycle of life” argument, has been identified and discussed. For more 
on this argument see O’Keefe 2003. 
7 For a concise examination of Philodemus’ life and works, see Gigante 2002. 
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chological disposition. One result of their adaptability is, I claim, that whether these arguments 
achieve their end—successfully treating human passions—is a question that can be answered on-
ly when the audience for whom they are intended is taken into account.  
I.2 
 The word “stochastic,” from the Greek verb στοχάζοµαι, literally means, “to aim or shoot 
at.” However, within Epicurean psychagogy the verb more narrowly means, “to endeavor to 
make out, to guess, to conjecture.”8 Although many patients recognize the psychagogue as “the 
one guide of right speech and action” (De lib. dic., 40.6-8), they will not openly confess their 
vices to him.9 Thus in order to come to a diagnosis the psychagogue must reason from signs, 
likely causes, and testimony. Philodemus’ epitome On Frank Criticism, essentially a compilation 
of notes from Zeno of Sidon’s lectures on the subject,10 is our chief source of information on this 
method. The epitome covers a wide range of topics, including how the psychagogue should ap-
proach illustrious men (cols. XXIIb – XXIVa), women (cols. XXIb – XXIIb), and old men (cols. 
XXIVa – XXIVb)—none of whom accept treatment willingly—and in addition provides us with 
valuable insight into life within an Epicurean community.  
 Philodemus offers several explanations for why patients are often reluctant to disclose 
their shortcomings. First, patients may keep their errors hidden out of shame. People care about 
their reputations, and how others, especially those whom they admire and respect, perceive them. 
Thus patients will attempt to conceal their vices, wishing to maintain their reputation among 
their peers and with the psychagogue. They will even go so far as to mimic the psychagogue’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This more narrow meaning may not be exclusive to Epicureanism. For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristo-
tle writes, “The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming 
(στοχαστικός) in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action” (VI.1141b13-14, 
revised Oxford translation). See also Nussbaum 1986, 53ff. 
9 All translations of Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism are from Konstan et al., 1998. The treatise is commonly re-
ferred to by its Latin name, De libertate dicendi.  
10 Zeno of Sidon was the scholarch of the Garden during the first century BCE.  
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behavior by correcting and admonishing others. But because their souls are diseased they will 
err. And even if the psychagogue were not around to witness his patient erring, other patients 
will be around, and they will report their observations to the psychagogue. 
 The extant fragments on the communal practice of “friendly spying” are scant. The fol-
lowing is a short but accurate summary. It was considered not only permissible, but expected that 
if a patient were concealing his faults, then others would, if they witnessed him err, then inform 
the psychagogue. Reporting on another’s errors was not considered slander (ibid., 50.3: 
διά[β]ολόν) because each desires that the other obtain correction. Thus an “informer” was seen 
as “a friend to his friend” (ibid., 50.7-8). A slanderer, by contrast, hopes to receive praise; he acts 
out of self-interest rather than in the interests of another. What distinguishes an “informer” from 
a slanderer, then, is the reason why he informs the psychagogue of another’s errors. 
 A second reason patients may withhold their shortcomings from the psychagogue is the 
following. Although the psychagogue surpasses his patients in theoretical argument (ibid., col. 
XXa.6-7: πρόβληµα λόγιος), they believe themselves to be better in character than him, and bet-
ter able to perceive what is preferable (ibid., col. XXa.8-12). These patients do not conceal their 
vices from their peers or the psychagogue, but instead deny that they have any vices at all. Here 
the psychagogue is less likely to rely on testimony in order to come to a diagnosis. Instead, he 
relies on their pride and arrogance. Because these patients believe that they are better than the 
psychagogue, they may reproach him in public. In doing so, their vices are displayed openly. 
 A third reason for a patient’s reluctance to reveal his errors is that he may believe that a 
particular behavior is not errant but natural, and therefore there is no reason to inform the psy-
chagogue. Philodemus provides the following example: “I deny that I have erred just now, but 
rather I slipped voluntarily into the ignorance of young people and because of this he thinks that 
7 
it is necessary to whip me” (ibid., 86N.5-9). Interestingly enough, Philodemus indicates that 
there is a ring of truth to this excuse. 
 Even though the psychagogue possesses perfect reason,11 he may still fail to make a cor-
rect diagnosis. “But in respect both to not attaining perfection and to passing [from] things that 
can not be permanently defended by a human being, one will slip” (ibid., 56.8-14). According to 
Philodemus, there are certain things that even perfected human reason cannot defend against. 
Unfortunately the text breaks off shortly after this (as it does in many places), and so exactly 
what these “things” are is unclear. But given what is said elsewhere in the epitome the following 
is a reasonable conjecture. 
 Because the psychagogue reasons from signs, likely causes, and the testimony of others, 
it is possible that even with all of this information he will still fail correctly to grasp his patient’s 
condition. And because he does not correctly grasp his patient’s condition, he will administer the 
wrong treatment.12 We may conclude, then, because a perfectly skilled psychagogue must work 
with incomplete and imperfect information, he cannot help but sometimes fail to “hit the mark.” 
However, unlike his physician counterpart, who “having made a mistake in the interpretation of 
the signs, never again purges [the patient] when he is afflicted by another disease” (ibid., 63.7-
11), the psychagogue is not so easily deterred. If he should err, this will not stop him from ad-
ministering another treatment to the same patient.13 
 Though the Epicurean psychagogue’s task would be much easier if his patients were will-
ing to openly and forthrightly to reveal their vices, we can see that not all patients fully under-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 While there are multiple tiers within the Epicurean school (students, scholars, professors, etc.), it seems to be the 
case that only wise men or sages were properly considered psychagogues. For more on Epicurean communal hierar-
chy, see Glad 1995, 152-60. See also De Witt 1936.  
12 On this point see De lib. dic., fr. 57 and col. 19b. See also Tsouna 2001b, 250-51. 
13 Philodemus is not clear about why the psychagogue, but not the physician, will continue to treat his patient, if he 
has administered wrongly a treatment. Pending further textual evidence, it seems to me that the psychagogue is just 
stubborn. The relevant fragments are De lib. dic., 63-67.  
8 
stand that “there will be no advantage for the one who hides; for not one thing escape[s] notice” 
(ibid., 41.8-10).14 (However, exceptions are noted. For example, Polyaenus was a patient who 
required only little correction before he became perfect (ibid., col. VIb.8-15)). Thus, the psycha-
gogue must reason stochastically from signs, likely causes, and testimony in order to diagnose 
his patients, and consequently comes to a very acute and personal understanding of his patients’ 
conditions.  
I.3  
During the first century BCE there was much debate within the Epicurean school about 
the nature of anger, what role, if any, it should play in a patient’s treatment, and how it ought to 
be treated therapeutically.15 Philodemus’ On Anger is our chief source of information on this de-
bate. In this rather sloppy treatise,16 Philodemus defends a distinction between ὀργή and θυµός, 
natural anger and irrational anger respectively,17 contending that the sage is subject to the former 
but not the latter. For my purposes here, however, the treatise is extremely interesting because it 
indicates that not all philosophical arguments are designed to treat a patient’s diseases directly. 
Rather, some arguments are designed to help persons recognize the severity of their condition 
and need for treatment.  
 In the previous section I discussed several reasons why patients do not often disclose 
their shortcomings to the psychagogue (thereby requiring him to reason stochastically in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 At this point some may sympathize with Momus’ criticism of Hephaestus’ craft, “that [Hephaestus] had not made 
windows in [man’s] chest, which could be opened to show everyone his desires and thoughts, and whether he was 
lying or telling the truth” (Lucian 2009, C.D.N. Costa’s translation). 
15 For instance, see De lib. dic., frs. 2, 67, and 70. 
16 Several scholars have noted that this treatise’s sloppy prose and the frequent anti-climatic endings of sections in-
dicate that the treatise was designed for the Epicurean lecture room where these sorts of imperfections could be cor-
rected on the spot. See Procopé 1998, 174-5 and Tsouna 2007, 195-7 (cf. Sanders 2009, 642-3). In his forthcoming 
translation of the treatise, David Armstrong draws attention repeatedly to Philodemus’ use of anti-climatic endings 
when making a point. See col. XIII on p. 9 below for an example. 
17 Note that this distinction inverts the “common classification.” Both Plato and Aristotle, for instance, identify the 
spirited part of the soul as θυµός, and speak positively of θυµοειδεῖς, high-spirited, men (NE III.8.1116b23ff). See 
also Tsouna 2007, 198ff. 
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come to a diagnosis). In addition to those reasons—shame, pride, or denial—it is often the case 
that patients do not recognize the severity of their condition and how much in need they are of 
therapy. If the psychagogue hopes to treat successfully his patients’ passions he must make them 
aware of this need, for “the chief cause of their [i.e., false beliefs] removal lies in our observing 
their greatness and the multitude of evils they posses and bring along with them” (De Ira, col. 
VI.9-12).18 The psychagogue may accomplish this task through the use of the τιθέναι πρὸ 
ὀµµάτων, to-set-before-the-eyes, therapeutic technique. 
 The to-set-before-the-eyes technique works in the following way. The psychagogue de-
scribes graphically (ibid., col. III.3: [ἀναγράφ]ων, III.11: γράφουσιν) before the patient’s eyes 
his present condition, and the likely consequences of leaving it untreated, thereby allowing it to 
grow worse. The following is a mild example.19 
And in every way they [i.e., the angry] hurt the victim of their blows least, they themselves mal-
treat themselves in all ways and because of this become enraged again and, entwined, act like a 
drunken man. Why is it necessary to say that, without hesitation [µηδ᾽ἀπ[ω]σµένους], but hastily 
[ἀλλ᾽ἐπισφεροµένους], they sometimes because of insensateness fall upon wood, into walls, in 
ditches, or something else? And if, becoming angrier still, just as usual, they will rip out eyes, slit 
nostrils, or even murder; they meet with likeness from the law and from those who are angry at 
them, and are exiled from the fatherland? These follow for those whose anger is boundless…. 
(ibid., col. XIII) 
 
Each application of this technique is tailored to a patient’s particular condition. The psychagogue 
will make use not only of those things that cause his patient to get “puffed up,” but also those 
things he cares deeply about, in order to bring before his eyes the terrifying reality of his present 
state.  
What makes the technique effective is the psychagogue’s vivid and graphic description of 
his prospective patient’s current condition. A cold and calculated diagnosis is, in certain situa-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Although all translations of Philodemus’ De Ira are my own, I am heavily indebted to David Armstrong, who 
generously made available to me a draft of his own forthcoming translation. For the Greek text I have used Indelli’s 
1988 edition.  
19 At De Ira col. XXIX, Philodemus writes that each of his examples thus far refer to reasonable and moderate evils, 
which result from a boundless anger. However, some of his examples are very graphic! Surely he cannot be serious.  
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tions, ineffective. Sometimes patients are too “puffed up,” and as a result their ability to reason 
has diminished greatly or, like Axiochus, their “suffering is not relieved by ingenuity; it’s satis-
fied only by what can come down to [their] level.”20 And in other cases, patients intentionally 
deceive themselves. “For even in this case, not taking to heart some things, and others incorrectly 
([ο]ὐ καθαρῶς), they themselves do not want to receive treatment” (ibid., col. IV.19-23). Prior to 
this passage Philodemus is discussing how even though a physician may “talk about…the great-
ness of the disease, and the sufferings that happen through it,” which sometimes fails to move 
patients, for they convince themselves that their condition is moderate or minor (ibid., col. IV.4-
18). The psychagogue must therefore set before his prospective patient’s eyes the reality of his 
current condition as graphically as possible, so as to demonstrate to the prospective patient that 
his current condition is not moderate or minor, but quite severe. 
 Contrary to our intuitions, the to-set-before-the-eyes technique is not distinct from philo-
sophical argument, but rather is a species of it. The psychagogue enumerates “everything that is 
hurting them [i.e., his patients] and the very unpleasant consequences that follow behind to the 
community, and sometimes even the evils that have hurt their personal affairs” (ibid., col. 
VII.10-13). In order to bridge the gap between his patient’s present condition and its likely con-
sequences the psychagogue will often liken his patient’s condition to another’s and, once he has 
described the tragedies that befell that person, conclude that his patient is likely to meet the same 
fate. Potential analogues include fellow Epicureans, e.g. “Metrodorus tells us how even Timocra-
tes [harmed] the eldest of his brothers Mentorides” (ibid., col. XII.7-8), mythical kings and their 
children, e.g. “they lash out against their kinsman just as if god-driven in truth…just like Oedi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 pseudo-Plato, Axiochus, 369e1-2, translation Jackson P. Hershbell. Even though the Axiochus is a pseudo-Platonic 
dialogue, it is nonetheless appropriate to my discussion here. In the dialogue Socrates makes use of a variety of phil-
osophical arguments in an effort to assuage Axiochus’ fear of death. In doing so, the dialogue demonstrates that 
some philosophical arguments are ineffective for treating some patients. For more on the Axiochus and Socrates’ 
use of various therapeutic arguments, see O’Keefe 2006.  
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pus’ sons” (ibid., col. XIV.4-6), or even the gods themselves, e.g. “[the gods torment the inno-
cent] just as we do, and some [of the gods] avenge themselves [upon the innocent] — as Apollo 
did upon those who cried ‘respect the priest!’ and the children of Niobe and Dionysus upon 
Cadmos for his daughters’ blasphemies” (ibid., col. XVI.8-12).21 
 Based on this description of the to-set-before-the-eyes technique, some may claim that, as 
a species of philosophical argument, it is a fallacious argument because the psychagogue “at-
tacks” a person’s character. And therefore, the to-set-before-the-eyes technique is really just an 
ad hominem argument. Such an observation is partially correct. The to-set-before-the-eyes tech-
nique is an ad hominem. However, in the context of Epicurean psychagogy, the use of such elab-
orate ad hominem arguments may be defended. To consider the psychagogue’s use of the to-set-
before-the-eyes technique fallacious demonstrates a failure to recognize the way in which com-
ments about a person’s character are relevant to the conclusion drawn by the psychagogue. 
The to-set-before-the-eyes technique is complex. As outlined above, the psychagogue 
likens his prospective patient to another. In doing so he pays special attention to his prospective 
patient’s present condition. Indeed, the psychagogue must, to the best of his ability, select an an-
alogue with which the prospective patient can readily identify if the argument is to fulfill its pur-
pose (i.e., bring before a person’s eyes the severity of his present condition and need for treat-
ment). If the prospective patient cannot readily perceive the similarities between himself and his 
analogue, then he will not make the further connection that he too will meet with similar conse-
quences if he fails to seek treatment. Now, an ad hominem argument attempts to undermine some 
proposition p through attacks on the character of the person who asserts p. However, the pro-
spective patient may not be committed to any p, e.g. ‘I am not in need of therapy.’ If the prospec-
tive patient has no commitment to p, then the psychagogue cannot undermine p by commenting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The conjectures (i.e., the bracketed phrases) in this passage are Armstrong’s own. 
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on the patient’s character. Some patients may even hold the belief, ‘I am in need of therapy,’ but 
lack the motivation necessary to seek therapy. In this case, the psychagogue’s use of the to-set-
before-the-eyes technique, specifically its vivid and graphic descriptions of the prospective pa-
tient’s condition, could provide the motivation presently lacking. Most importantly, though, ad 
hominem arguments are regarded as fallacious philosophical arguments because propositions 
about a person’s character are often irrelevant to the truth or falsity of p. But if the prospective 
patient does hold some p, i.e., ‘I am not in need of therapy,’ then comments about their character 
are very relevant to the truth or falsity of that p. And therefore, because the propositions used by 
the psychagogue to demonstrate the severity of his prospective patient’s current condition are in 
fact relevant to whether the prospective patient is in need of therapy, the to-set-before-the-eyes 
technique is not fallacious, even though it is an ad hominem. 
 In closing, because the purpose of the to-set-before-the-eyes technique is to help prospec-
tive patients recognize the severity of their present condition and consequent need for therapy, 
the psychagogue often describes his prospective patient’s current condition in a very vivid and 
graphic way. The presence of this therapeutic technique demonstrates that Epicurean psychagogy 
is highly adaptable; it can accommodate any patient’s particular condition. Furthermore, it also 
demonstrates how philosophical arguments are not always designed to treat a patient’s condition 
directly, but rather are sometimes designed to drive a prospective patient to seek treatment. 
I.4 
 The final feature of Epicureanism that I would like to highlight is, I think, an obvious 
one. In the last section we saw how some philosophical arguments serve specific therapeutic 
purposes. In addition, we also saw how some of these arguments are capable of adapting them-
selves to particular patients. This is possible because for the Epicureans the norms of rational 
13 
discourse are valuable only instrumentally—only insofar as they contribute to the procurement of 
pleasure and freedom from pain. In this respect the Epicurean approach to therapy is much like 
that of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics.22 
 In the final sections of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), Sextus Empiricus answers the 
question, “Why do Skeptics sometimes deliberately propound arguments of feeble plausibility?” 
The answer is simple. Skeptics are philanthropists, and as such endeavor to cure another’s dis-
eases, οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν, self-conceit and rashness, through philosophical argument. And 
just as the physician will use only as strong a treatment as is needed, so too will the Skeptic use 
only as rigorous and “weighty” as argument as is needed. Sextus does not elaborate much on 
what makes an argument “weighty” as opposed to “feeble.” However the word πιθανότησιν, 
which is used several times within the passage, indicates that at least one major factor is an ar-
gument’s “persuasiveness” or “plausibility.” Presumably persons whose ability to assess critical-
ly and scrutinize an argument is weak will require only a “feeble” argument, whereas a person 
whose ability is stronger will require a more “weighty” argument. For the former, then, philan-
thropic Skeptics will use arguments others regard as “feeble” to cure their patient, “since often a 
weaker argument is sufficient for them to achieve their purpose.”23 
 The Epicurean psychagogue will also use “feeble” arguments with his patients, for an ar-
gument’s clarity, cogency, and consistency are valuable only insofar as they contribute to a pa-
tient’s procurement of pleasure and avoidance of pain. In this respect, an argument’s clarity, co-
gency, and consistency occupy the same position within Epicureanism as τό καλόν, the noble, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 However Casey Perin has challenged this view recently. See Perin 2010. 
23 PH 281. The point here is that the skeptic suspends judgment as to whether or not his arguments are objectively 
“weighty” or “feeble.” This is a concern held by his critics. Instead, the skeptic concerns himself with picking out 
those arguments that will be most effective in treating the dogmas that afflict his patient and, presumably, the more 
skilled a physician is, the better he will be at identifying these arguments. We may surmise that this suspension of 
judgment applies to philosophical argumentation generally; that is, to many of the arguments within Sextus’ own 
treatises, which have been judged deficient in various ways. I thank Jessica Berry and Tim O’Keefe for bringing this 
to my attention. 
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and the virtues. In the words of Epicurus, “One must honour the noble, and the virtues and things 
like that, if they produce pleasure. But if they do not, one must bid them goodbye.”24 We may 
also recall the opening sections of Epicurus’ letter to Pythocles. Here Epicurus writes that even 
his teachings on meteorological phenomena are valuable only insofar as they contribute to the 
procurement of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Knowledge of these matters is not intrinsically 
valuable (Ep. Pyth. 85). With the exception of pleasure and pain everything else is, according to 
the Epicureans, only instrumentally valuable. And so as concerns the norms of rational discourse, 
they are valuable only insofar as they contribute to curing a patient’s disease(s) and ridding him 
of his false beliefs. And what will be most effective (i.e., valuable) in achieving this end will de-
pend on the patient in question. 
 I pointed to one example of this in the previous section—the to-set-before-the-eyes thera-
peutic technique. (In fact, it seems to me that it is this technique in particular that requires a flex-
ible commitment to an argument’s clarity, cogency, and so forth.) What is particularly striking is 
that the psychagogue will not only indulge the prospective patient’s delusions (that he is similar 
to Ares, for instance), but will even use premises that are, for the Epicureans, blatantly false. 
Above I noted that potential analogues include the gods themselves. Comparing a prospective 
patient’s present condition to that of a god’s will be effective in driving the prospective patient to 
seek therapy only if the prospective patient considers himself sufficiently similar to the god in 
question, and therefore likely to meet with similar misfortunes should he allow his present condi-
tion to remain as is, or grow worse. And recall that the cause of many misfortunes for human be-
ings is their boundless (i.e., vain and empty) desires, supported by false beliefs about what is tru-
ly good and bad. But for the Epicureans such reasoning is demonstrably false. The gods cannot, 
according to Epicurus, capable of suffering misfortune, for the gods are not the sorts of beings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Usener (Us.) 67, trans. Inwood & Gerson. 
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that can have the requisite false beliefs, which support those vain and empty desires (e.g. greed, 
lust) that bring about misfortune.25 
 Moreover, the effectiveness of the to-set-before-the-eyes technique lies in its use of vivid 
imagery. “For which reason, describing pictorially [ἀναγράφων] some things the patient is totally 
ignorant of, some he has come to forget, some unreckoned of at least with respect to their im-
portance, if nothing else, and others he never contemplated as a whole, and putting all of this in 
his view he [i.e. the psychagogue] creates a great fright” (De Ira, col. IV.5-15). And this may 
then be contrasted with the therapeutic art of παρρησία. While the to-set-before-the-eyes tech-
nique relies on vivid imagery, so that the prospective patient will realize the severity of his pre-
sent condition, παρρησία relies on, at least when administered to “strong” students, violent lan-
guage. Thus, towards “those who are exceedingly strong, both by nature [and] because of their 
progress, {he will criticize} with all passion and <[blame] and>…” (De lib. dic., 10.7-11), and 
“after these things he will also set both the difficulties that accompany and will be attached to 
those who are such, <saying> again <and again, ‘You are doing [wrong],’” (ibid., 11.4-10). The 
takeaway here is that, at least in the initial stages of treatment, reasoning itself is insufficient. As 
a result, the psychagogue is willing to indulge a patient’s delusions, make use of premises in con-
flict with the Epicurean doctrines, and describe graphically before a prospective patient’s eyes 
the severity of his present condition, so that the prospective patient’s emotions will allow him to 
see clearly the severity of his present condition and need for treatment.  
 In closing, I should like to state clearly an important difference between the Skeptic’s 
“feeble” arguments and Epicurean ones. Whereas the Skeptics will use “feeble” arguments to 
cure their patients of self-conceit and rashness, the Epicurean will typically use “feeble” argu-
ments to drive persons to seek therapy. Even though there are certainly major dissimilarities be-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 On this and related points, see KD 1, Ep. Men. 123-24, Ep. Hdt. 76-7, DRN V.146-55, and VI.68-79.  
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tween the patient and other members of the Epicurean school, mythical kings, and the gods 
(which might prevent the argument from being persuasive to a critical and scrutinizing mind), 
the effectiveness of these arguments lies primarily in their use of vivid imagery. Thus, insofar as 
this technique contributes to the patient’s well-being the psychagogue will make use of the 
norms of rational discourse only as needed. 
I.5 
  Up to now I have been discussing three distinct aspects of Epicurean psychagogy. In this 
section I tie together these three features using a medical analogy to illustrate the adaptability of 
Epicurean psychagogy. In doing so, I conclude that when evaluating the efficacy of Epicurean 
philosophical arguments it is necessary to place them alongside the audience for whom they were 
intended. 
 Suppose you have been in a terrible car accident and consequently have suffered a broken 
leg. An onlooker notified the authorities and now you are on your way to the hospital. Upon arri-
val your physician can see clearly that your leg is broken—it is very swollen and severely 
bruised—and will require treatment. However, these observations alone are not enough for your 
physician to determine what sort of treatment will be most effective. So in an effort to administer 
the most effective treatment your physician sets out to gather more information. 
 Your physician may phone the person who saw the crash and ask about any relevant de-
tails or speak with the paramedics who brought you in. In addition, he will likely x-ray your leg 
so as to get a clear image of the break or breaks involved. Once your physician has gathered a 
sufficient amount of information about your case, he will then prescribe a course of treatment. 
Here the physician reasons stochastically in order to come to a diagnosis that is suited to his pa-
tient, just as the psychagogue does. 
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 If the break in your leg is a relatively minor one, your physician may simply put a cast on 
it, advise you to stay off your feet for a few weeks, and then to visit the hospital twice a week for 
a minor regimen of physical therapy. However, if the break in your leg is quite severe, more 
drastic or invasive measures may be required. For instance, you may have to go into surgery in 
order to have the break repaired. Here, too, the most effective type of surgery will depend on the 
particular nature of the break in your leg. A few screws may be required, perhaps even a metal 
rod. As a result you may be advised to stay off your feet for a few months, and afterwards to visit 
the hospital five days a week for an intense regimen of physical therapy.  
 In administering treatment, your physician makes use of certain aspects of medicine only 
as necessary. If your leg does not require a thorough and intense surgery, you will not be subject 
to it.26 Similarly, if you are not immobile for a lengthy period of time, the subsequent physical 
therapy will be less than for someone who was immobile for a longer period of time. Once again, 
the physician’s and the psychagogue’s practices are similar. Just as your physician uses certain 
aspects of medicine only as necessary, so too does the psychagogue makes use of the norms of 
rational discourse only as needed in order to treat his patient. 
 Finally, after your leg has been put in a cast (with or without surgery), your physician 
will likely encourage you to follow any instructions he may give you and, once your cast comes 
off, complete the recommended physical therapy. In doing so, he is sure to inform you of the 
likely consequences, should you fail to follow his instructions. Such consequences may include 
prolonged pain and discomfort or reduced mobility once the leg has “healed.” If necessary, your 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 We may also regard it was unethical, or at least imprudent, to subject individuals to procedures unwarranted by 
their present condition. The Epicureans appear to believe something similar when it comes to the therapeutic art of 
παρρησία. (They may also believe that it would be unethical, or at least imprudent, to subject individuals to proce-
dures unwarranted by their present condition generally, but at present I cannot find any evidence to support the more 
general claim.) Patients are to be reproached in accordance with their given capacities for frank criticism. Failure to 
do so may result in harming, instead of healing, the patient, with the additional possibility of rendering them incura-
ble. I discuss this in greater detail below.  
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physician may go further, if he knows you on a more personal level. If you like to hike, for in-
stance, he may remind you that failure to follow his recommendations will likely impact your 
ability to go hiking for long periods of time, or even at all. In this way too, your physician and 
the psychagogue use similar techniques (i.e., to-set-before-the-eyes).27 
 What all this demonstrates is that the physician adapts his medical knowledge to his pa-
tient’s condition, thus designing a treatment that is tailored to that patient. The result of this is 
that when we judge whether or not this type of treatment is effective, we must necessarily con-
sider the particular condition of the patient for whom the treatment was designed. Because the 
physician’s methods are nearly identical to the psychagogue’s, it follows that when we judge 
whether or not the philosophical arguments propounded by the Epicureans to treat human pas-
sions are effective we must necessarily consider the particular condition of the patient for whom 
they were designed.  
As I noted at the outset of this paper, some scholars contend that the Epicureans’ argu-
ments are intended to serve as a universal panacea against the fear of death. Such an interpreta-
tion leaves the Epicureans’ arguments open to the objection that they often fail. However, that 
interpretation is the wrong one, and the interpretation I have argued for here is sufficient for 
mounting a defense for many of the Epicureans’ arguments. Because the Epicurean psychagogue 
is sensitive to his patient’s condition, he will constructs arguments that are designed to be effec-
tive for that patient. If a patient is not persuaded by one argument against the fear of death, it 
does not then follow that the argument is an ineffective argument per se. Rather it means that the 
argument is the wrong sort of argument for that patient given his particular condition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Even though the physician’s use of the to-set-before-the-eyes technique is less robust and passionate than the psy-
chagogue’s typically is, the physician uses a cold and clinical tone because that is what is effective. Thus, the physi-
cian’s use of moral portraiture is also context-sensitive. I thank Jessica Berry for this observation. 
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PART II: The Patient-Relativity Thesis Defended 
II.1 
In the previous chapter I argued that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they 
necessarily adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience. 
There are two additional matters that require a fuller treatment than those I discussed in the last 
chapter, giving these matters their due treatment is the central task of this chapter. 
 In Part I argued that, in the light of certain psychagogic practices and aspects of Epicure-
an philosophy, the Epicureans tailored their arguments to their intended audience to make them 
more therapeutically effective. Is there any indication that the converse is true? That is, did the 
Epicureans think that failure to tailor their arguments to their intended audience would render 
them not only ineffective, but also potentially damaging? If it can be demonstrated that the Epi-
cureans thought non-tailored arguments would be either therapeutically ineffective, or potentially 
damaging, then the patient-relativity thesis gains additional support.  
 Furthermore, we may be concerned about the instrumental value the Epicureans placed 
on the norms of rational discourse. Because the norms of rational discourse are valued only inso-
far as they contribute to a patient’s recovery, the Epicureans are able to adapt their arguments so 
as to be therapeutically effective (e.g. motivating persons to seek therapy) for a diverse group of 
patients. But some may worry, because the norms of rational discourse are valued only instru-
mentally, whether this leaves open the possibility that the Epicureans would construct philosoph-
ical arguments in which these norms are violated outright if they could be shown to be equally 
effective therapeutically. The presence of such arguments would be at odds with the rest of Epi-
curean philosophy, and pose a serious difficulty for the patient-relativity thesis. 
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 In the first part of this chapter I deal with the former matter. Returning to Philodemus’ 
On Frank Criticism, I give an account of the therapeutic practice of παρρησία. Philodemus 
indicates that while all instances of frankness are painful for the patient, if a patient receives 
criticism that is inappropriate, determined by his particular capacity for παρρησία, it may be 
especially damaging, including the possibility that the patient may become incurable. I explain 
why παρρησία is necessarily painful, and describe two possible scenarios in which a patient 
could be harmed through παρρησία. The latter concern occupies the second half of the chapter. 
Though the norms of rational discourse are valued instrumentally, this does not entail that they 
may be violated outright during philosophical argumentation. What the Epicureans have to say 
about justice, which is also of only instrumental value, will prove essential for understanding the 
instrumental value ascribed to the norms of rational discourse, and their role in Epicurean 
psychagogy. 
II.2 
 The word παρρησία, “frankness” or “frank criticism,” was originally used to refer to the 
right of any freeborn Athenian male to speak his mind without consequences.28 But within the 
context of Epicurean therapy, παρρησία refers jointly to the act of admonishment (De lib. dic., 
36.7-8: τὴν νουθέτησιν) and the disposition to be forthcoming and candid, which is cultivated in 
initiates, and refined in dedicatees, because it contributes to the well-being of the community.29 
 Admonishment is administered, through the stochastic method,30 when a member of the 
Epicurean community has erred in his or her conduct. But Philodemus is clear that we “do not do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Glad 1995, 106. In antiquity, παρρησία (frankness) was often contrasted with flattery, and those who were known 
as “frank counselors” stood in opposition to flatterers (ibid., 37ff). Cf. Sider 2004, 90: “Παρρσηία, that is παν + 
ῥῆσις, originally was a typically Athenian characteristic (praiseworthy or blameworthy, depending on one’s point of 
view), meaning not necessarily that one did in fact say everything but that the citizen was able to ‘say everything’.” 
29 For a brief sketch of life within an Epicurean community, see De Witt 1936.  
30 See I.2. 
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it {i.e., criticize frankly} continually, nor against everyone, nor every chance error, nor {errors} 
of those whom one should not {criticize} when they are present, nor with merriment, but rather 
[to take up errors] sympathetically [and not to] scorn [or insult]” (ibid., 81 N.4-12).31 
Admonishment is delivered on an ad hoc basis. The Epicureans were aware that an overall attack 
on a person’s character is “unfriendly to {his} security and a foolish harshness” (ibid., 80 N.2-3). 
For this reason they advocated moderate (ibid., 6.8: µετρίως) reproaches, as Epicurus reproaches 
Pythocles.32 And, although frank criticism was practiced by every member of the community,33 
certain “jabs” (ibid., col. VIIa.5: [κατα]φορὰς) were considered inappropriate for anyone but the 
most senior members of the community (ibid., col. VIIa.6: σοφοῖ[ς]) to inflict.34 
 Παρρησία may be administered in either its “subtle” (ibid., 68.1: ποικίλης) or its “simple” 
form (both of which admit of varying degrees). The “subtle” form of παρρησία consists of both 
praise and blame, mixed appropriately for the patient. The “simple” form of παρρησία, on the 
other hand, is purely blame, and may be delivered through shouting (ibid., 7.7: 
ἐγκραυγασθῶσ[ι]), should the psychagogue deem it necessary to give way to his anger.35 Patients 
may also be criticized in public (i.e., in front of their peers). However, the psychagogue must be 
careful when delivering public criticism, as it can be very painful. These two general forms of 
παρρησία most likely correspond to the two types of patients commonly discussed throughout 
the epitome. Philodemus commonly refers to “weak” (ibid., 7.2: τῶν ἁπαλῶν) patients and 
“strong” (ibid., 7.6: τοὺς ἰσχυροῦς) patients. “Weak” patients are commonly characterized as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Cf. De lib. dic., cols. Ia-IIb. The presence of curly brackets ({}) in this quotation (and any further quotations from 
De libertate dicendi) indicates that the contents are the translators’ (i.e., Konstan, et al.) additions or clarifications. 
For a full list of sigla used by Konstan, et al. in Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi, see p. 25 of their edition. 
32 See ibid., fr. 6. 
33 See ibid., fr. 81N.1-4. 
34 For some indication that one’s ability to apply παρρησία appropriately stems from one’s wisdom, see ibid., col. 
Vb.  
35 For a brief discussion of παρρησία delivered with “anger-in-combination-with-hatred” and παρρησία delivered 
with “anger-in-combination-with-blame,” see Tsouna 2007, 97-98. See also De lib. dic., fr. 92 N.  
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highly obedient and insecure in their new philosophic way of life, whereas “strong” patients are 
stubborn, arrogant, and in some cases resistant to all but the harshest forms of παρρησία. How-
ever, patients may also be classified as “strong” if their progression within the Epicurean school 
has reached a certain point.36 
 Although παρρησία may be administered in either its “subtle” form or “simple” form, and 
tailored so as to be effective for a particular patient and his or her particular error, each 
administration is painful to some degree.37 By criticizing frankly, the psychagogue rouses those 
harmful passions, irrational emotions, and vices: “[f]lattery, arrogance, irascibility, slander 
(13.2), envy and malicious joy, a misplaced sense of dignity and shame, vanity, self-conceit and 
vainglory.”38 Sometimes he will even encounter faults as severe as injustice and impiety.39 When 
these passions, emotion, and vices are attacked, patients often become “puffed up” (Ibid., 66.7: 
ἐκχαυνο[ῦ]σι) as their souls “swell” (Ibid., 67.1: τὴν συνοίδ[η]σι[ν]). As a result the patient is 
not able to reason clearly, and may even refuse to heed the psychagogue’s admonission. In 
extreme cases, where the patient’s soul has become very swollen and παρρησία has not been 
completely effective, Philodemus urges his reader to turn away from the one who has erred until 
the swelling has gone down before correcting him again.40  
 Further evidence in favor of each application of παρρησία being painful, especially when 
vices such as irascibility are roused, can be found in Philodemus’ De Ira. Philodemus describes 
the angry man as one who “has the eyes of madmen, and sometimes even sends forth sparks of 
light, as the greatest of poets seem to have signified, both ‘gazing’ and looking ‘distraught’ on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 On this point see Armstrong 2008, 99. 
37 For a different, but not necessarily opposing, explanation of why παρρησία is necessarily painful, see Tsouna 
2001b. “The ethical legitimacy of frank speech is secured through the claim that it has its basis in nature. The 
student feels a ‘biting’, a discomfort at something he has done, which promts the (natural) desire to confess his 
action to the teacher or to a classmate” (249). For more on “bites” in Philodemus, see Tsouna 2007, 32-51. 
38 Tsouna 2007, 95. 
39 See De lib. dic., fr. 6 for an instance of the latter. 
40 See ibid., frs. 66 & 67. 
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those with whom he is angered, and singularly flushed as well in the face, most frequently, but 
some of them with blood-red face, some with neck tensed and swelling veins and their saliva bit-
ter and salty” (De Ira, fr. 6). Further, the angry man suffers “the trembling and shakings of the 
limbs and paralyses, such as come also upon the epileptic, so that as they relentlessly pursue us 
our whole life is afflicted, and one takes up the most of its time in the nourishment of misery. 
How many it has afflicted, it and its consequence, breaking of lungs and pains in the sides and 
many-a-life-threatening-ill-of-that-sort, you can hear from any physician and observe when you 
look at them carefully. And they are always so liable to black bile that often [they turn their 
hearts black]” (ibid., col. IX).  
 Because each application of παρρησία is accompanied by at least a slight sting,41 and at 
worst great pain of the body and soul, Philodemus emphasizes repeatedly that παρρησία must, in 
all but the most extreme cases, be delivered from a kind and gentle disposition. Failure to do so 
could result in a patient’s being damaged severely. In addition, because each application of 
παρρησία is tailored to the patient’s condition in the light of a particular error, failing to deliver 
the appropriate amounts of praise and blame, or foregoing praise altogether, could result in harm 
to the patient.42 Both of these scenarios are probable.  
 As mentioned above, everyone within the community practices the art of παρρησία. 
However, only the most senior members of the community may reproach certain actions—as the 
wisest and least likely to err when reasoning stochastically, they are therefore least likely to ad-
minister a form of παρρησία that could harm a patient.43 But, because the psychagogue must rea-
son stochastically with imperfect or incomplete information, he too will sometimes slip and, con-
sequently, harm his patient. In addition, some patients believe they are wiser than the most senior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 On this point see, ibid., col. VIIIb. 
42 Cf. Tsouna 2001b, 251. 
43 Tsouna echoes this observation. See ibid., 250-51. 
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members of the community. Thus, some patients will administer παρρησία where it is not right 
for them to do so.44 And this, because they are impure and still susceptible to their own vices, is 
likely to harm greatly not only the patient receiving criticism, but also the patient who wrongly 
criticizes. “But when the rebuke comes, they have their pretense exposed, just like those who are 
compelled to dine together for the sake of politeness, when they <[correct somewhat]> {their 
fellow diners}” (De lib. dic., col. XVIb.6-13). Finally, Philodemus indicates in one fragment that 
it is even possible for patients to become “incurable” (ibid., 59.10-11: ἀ[ν]αλθεῖς; cf. 88N.11-12: 
ἀθεραπεύτου) because of παρρησία.45 
 As Philodemus’ discussion of the therapeutic art of παρρησία makes clear, the analogy 
between philosophical psychagogy and empirical medicine was intended to include the possibil-
ity that, should the psychagogue deliver a treatment “harsher” than necessary, he, like his physi-
cian counterpart, runs the risk of harming his patient and, in extreme cases, can leave him “in-
curable.” Far from a simple aversion to shock tactics, the Epicureans believed that patients 
should be supported emotionally during therapy.46 This principle is perhaps most clearly ex-
pressed in the following: “When he is not disappointed in some people, or very vehemently indi-
cating his own annoyance, he will not, as he speaks, forget ‘dearest’ and ‘sweetest’ and similar 
things” (De lib dic., 14.5-10). 
II.3 
 In Part I, I argued that the norms of rational discourse—clarity, cogency, and consisten-
cy—are only instrumentally valuable for the Epicureans. Because the norms of rational discourse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See, for instance, De lib. dic., col. XVIa. 
45 See also ibid., fr. 59. The fragment breaks off before we are able to learn why and how παρρησία may cause pa-
tients to become incurable. Interestingly enough, Philodemus writes that even though a patient may become “incura-
ble,” the psychagogue does not cease to treat him in accordance with his given capacity for παρρησία. Because even 
the psychagogue may err in his reasoning, he may falsely judge a patient as “incurable” who, contrary to all expecta-
tions, seems to heal suddenly. Cf. ibid., frs. 32, 84N, 88N.  
46 Tsouna 2007, 97. 
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are valued only instrumentally, some may wonder if they may be violated outright during treat-
ment. Would the psychagogue deliver to his patient a fallacious, garbled, and inconsistent argu-
ment, if doing so would be effective in correcting the patient’s false beliefs? 
 Consider another object of instrumental value—justice. Epicurus defined justice as some-
thing useful in mutual associations.47 More narrowly, justice is an agreement between parties 
neither to harm one another nor be harmed. However, justice is also context-sensitive; an action 
is unjust only if it violates an existing agreement between parties. Epicurus states this clearly in 
KD 36: “In general outline justice is the same for everyone; for it was something useful in mutu-
al associations. But with respect to the peculiarities of a region or of other [relevant] causes, it 
does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Relevant causes may include changes 
in “objective circumstances,” as is indicated in KD 38.48 Finally, even though justice is instru-
mentally valuable and context-sensitive, the Epicureans do not advise committing injustice 
whenever it may be beneficial.49 According to Epicurus, because one can never be certain that he 
will forever escape detection, he will forever live in fear of being found out, which will cause 
him considerable mental distress. And therefore, because it can never be beneficial to act unjust-
ly, one should never act unjustly.  
Here we have a general definition of a concept that is adaptable to a potentially wide 
range of scenarios. But the range of possible adaptations is at the same time constrained, for, 
while there are many types of agreements that are useful in mutual associations, there are also 
many agreements that would not be useful in mutual associations. Indeed, such agreements (or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See KD 31, 33, 36. 
48 “…And if objective circumstances do change the same things which had been just turn out to be no longer useful, 
then those things were just as long as they were useful for the mutual associations of fellow citizens; but later, when 
they were not useful, they were no longer just.” 
49 See for instance KD 34, 35.  
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lack thereof) would lead to mental distress that would affect the individual until his death. The 
same structure, I think, applies to the norms of rational discourse. 
 Epicurus does not define the norms of rational discourse explicitly. And yet, he does not 
need to. Philosophers and non-philosophers alike understand that there are certain norms that in-
terlocutors ought to conform to when conversing with one another. At the very least, our remarks 
should be clear, they should be consistent with one another, and, if we dare to advance any posi-
tion or defend one, it should be done cogently. But we also recognize that our ability to conform 
to these norms will depend on the idiosyncrasies of the situation we find ourselves in, particular-
ly our interlocutor. Philodemus’ discussion of how the psychagogue should use παρρησία on 
“weak” and “strong” students demonstrates that the Epicureans acknowledged this fact. Now ob-
jectively speaking, some conversations may appear clearer and more consistent, while others 
seem less clear and more inconsistent. Moreover, in some conversations our advancement or de-
fense of a position may be less cogent than in others. But subjectively speaking this will not be 
the case, for there is a particular manner of conversation that we should assume given the idio-
syncrasies of our interlocutor. Let us return to justice for a moment to clarify this point.  
 If we were to survey a variety of mutual associations between parties, recording those 
agreements deemed useful, and then set them alongside each other, we would perhaps be in-
clined to consider some “more just” than others. In doing so, we would be placing ourselves (to 
some degree) in the relevant situation, judging agreement A as useful, and agreement B as non-
useful. And to some extent our judgments would be correct. For us, agreement A would be use-
ful, and therefore just, while agreement B would not be useful, and would therefore not be just. 
But again our judgments about such agreements are only partially correct, because it is we our-
selves judging them. If we place ourselves within a particular context, in order to judge whether 
27 
or not a set of agreements deemed useful in the mutual association of two parties are in fact use-
ful, we then create a new context distinct from the original one. And to judge the original context 
from the viewpoint of newly created one is misguided. A similar conclusion follows in the case 
of conversation. If we judge objectively a variety of expressions as more or less clear, more or 
less consistent, we neglect the context in which such expressions were constructed, and whether 
or not the construction of those expressions serves some subjective end. So, objectively speak-
ing, it appears as if the norms of rational discourse may be violated to a greater or lesser degree 
depending upon the interlocutor in question. But, as far as I am concerned, the norms of rational 
discourse are not violated; the standard to which we can reasonably be expect to conform our 
statements to them in conversations is adjusted in light of our interlocutor’s particular psycholog-
ical state.  
 In order to complete this account of the place of the norms of rational discourse within 
Epicurean philosophy, one final component is required. In the case of justice the Epicureans do 
not advise that an injustice should ever be committed, because committing an injustice can never 
benefit a person, for the consequent fear of detection will persist, tormenting him until his death. 
So, too, the psychagogue, in the course of a patient’s therapy, can never deliver an argument that 
is fallacious, garbled, and inconsistent. The role these norms play in curing a patient’s soul is in-
dispensible, and evidence of this fact can be found throughout the extant Epicurean texts. Ac-
cording to Epicurus it is only through the study of natural science that our fears and anxieties 
about heavenly phenomena, myths, and death can be dissolved (KD 11-13). It is only through the 
use of reason that we can mount a sufficient defense against Chance (KD 16). Only reason af-
fords us with the ability to set a limit on our desires (KD 30), and to recognize that “unlimited 
time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure” (KD 19). Such decrees are not unique 
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to Epicurus. Lucretius too writes, in several places, “this terrifying darkness that enshrouds the 
mind must be dispelled not by the sun’s rays and the dazzling darts of day, but by study of the 
superficial aspect and underlying principle of nature” (DRN 1.146-48). And Philodemus, after 
concluding his mock diatribe, where he criticizes the Stoics for failing to treat sufficiently a pa-
tient’s irrational anger, declares, “[And nothing can save you from all this] but the Canonic rea-
soning (καν[ονικοῦ] λόγου)” (De Ira, col. XXXI.9-11).50 While diatribes constitute an important 
part of the therapeutic process, in order to conquer anger the patient must also acquire an under-
standing of the Epicurean canons and the arguments that support them. For the Epicureans, then, 
the norms of rational discourse are, like the virtues, indispensible from the pleasant life.51 And 
thus it is not possible for the psychagogue to deliver fallacious, garbled, and inconsistent argu-
ments to his patients during the course of their therapy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See also De Ira, col. I. Here Philodemus comments on Timasagoras’ approach towards the treatment of anger. 
Philodemus writes, “For if he [i.e., Timasagoras] had rebuked those that only censure anger and do little or nothing 
else about it, like Bion in his On Anger and Chrysippus in the ‘Therapeutic’ book of his treatise On Emotions, he 
would have taken a reasonable position” (De Ira, col. I.12-20). 
51 On this point see KD 5: “It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and 
impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live 
pleasantly.”  
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PART III: Patient-Relativity and the Arguments of Epicurus, Lucretius, and Philodemus 
III.1 
In the previous chapter I discussed at length two concerns surrounding my thesis—the analogy 
between philosophical psychagogy and empirical medicine, and the relationship between the 
norms of rational discourse and therapeutic effectiveness. In this chapter I put my thesis into 
practice. First, I discuss three arguments against the fear of death from Epicurus and Lucretius. 
Although each argument arrives at the same conclusion (i.e., “death is nothing to us”), it does so 
in its own way, so as to be therapeutically effective for its intended audience. My discussion of 
these arguments is focused on who the intended audiences are, why, in light of them, the argu-
ments are constructed the way they are, and how their construction makes them therapeutically 
effective. Then I turn to the arguments of Philodemus’ On Death. My discussion of these argu-
ments largely mirrors that of the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius. However, at times my 
discussion is more complicated because Philodemus’ arguments are more intricate and display a 
high level of adaptation. My decision to discuss first the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius, 
and then the arguments of Philodemus, is motivated by two reasons. 
Some of Philodemus’ writings are concerned with subjects that had not been examined 
critically by earlier Epicureans. In addition to composing treatises on conventional subjects, 
Philodemus also wrote on rhetoric, music, and poetry, including a treatise titled On the Good 
King according to Homer. In the words of one scholar, Philodemus is truly a “‘Panaitios des 
Kepos’—an Epicurean who moderniz[ed] the Epicurean school’s discussion topics as Panaetius 
and Posidonius did those of the Stoa.”52 In arguing that Epicurean philosophical arguments are 
patient-relative, I have relied heavily on Philodemus’ treatises, in particular his On Frank Criti-
cism and On Anger. Demonstrating that the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius exhibit this fea-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Armstrong 2008, 89. 
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ture helps quell, at least to some degree, the worry that patient-relativity applies only to the ar-
guments of Zeno and Philodemus’ Epicureanism. 
In addition, the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius serve as a helpful stepping-stone be-
tween the concept of patient-relativity and its manifestation in the arguments of Philodemus’ On 
Death. More interesting than anything else in Philodemus’ treatises is his acute understanding of 
the various harmful emotions, evil dispositions, and vices, and their infinitely many combina-
tions, that bring about physical and mental suffering. Thus Philodemus’ arguments, especially in 
On Death, are highly adaptive—they target not only the patient’s fear of death in a unique way, 
but also those false beliefs, and vain and empty desires, that surround and support it. By discuss-
ing the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius first, we are able to witness relatively simple adap-
tations of an argument, before turning to those complex, highly adaptive arguments of Philode-
mus. 
III.2 
 At the outset of the thesis I quoted a famous Epicurean dictum for why death is nothing 
to us: 
Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no perception, and what has no percep-
tion is nothing to us. (KD 2) 
 
Although this dictum appears time and again throughout extant Epicurean texts, there are three 
instances that demonstrate that earlier Epicureans did in fact adapt their arguments for particular 
audiences.  
The first occurrence is found in Epicurus’ letter to Menoeceus. Here the dictum appears 
without much modification:  
Become accustomed to believing death to be nothing to us. Since all good and bad lies in percep-
tion, and death is the deprivation of perception. (Ep. Men. 124)  
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Although the letter in which this passage appears is addressed to Menoeceus, Epicurus’ intended 
audience is much broader. As is the case with his letters on physics and meteorological phenom-
ena, addressed to Herodotus and Pythocles respectively, they are not for them alone but many 
others too.53 But Epicurus’ letters are not for everyone. By this I mean that, as general summar-
ies, the achievement of their purpose, “to facilitate the firm memorization of the most general 
doctrines, in order that at each and every opportunity they may be able to help themselves in the 
most important issues” (Ep. Hdt. 35), will likely be unsuccessful with non-dedicatees of Epicure-
anism. 
 Because these letters are largely summaries of the major subject areas of Epicureanism, 
Epicurus often gives his reader short and simple arguments designed to demonstrate the truth of 
various core beliefs. In addition, Epicurus does not so much demonstrate that other, competing 
views are false as he urges his reader to avoid them altogether, or flat-out condemns them.54 
Moreover, Epicurus’ language in each letter is often commanding, e.g. “Do and practice what I 
constantly told you to do, believing these to be the elements of living well” (Ep. Men. 123).55 
These three aspects of Epicurus’ letters suggest, I think, that Epicurus’ audience is those patients 
who are already dedicatees of Epicureanism. 
 That Epicurus’ audience is likely present dedicatees of Epicureanism allows him to deliv-
er simple philosophical arguments in a straightforward way. Unlike the arguments of Lucretius, 
discussed below, Epicurus’ arguments can be free of rhetoric and poetic imagery. Indeed, such 
letters will not provide every detail, or refute all criticisms, for they are for those “who are una-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ep. Pyth. 85. 
54 For example, “And thunderbolts can be produced in several different ways—just be sure that myths are kept out 
of it!” (Ep. Pyth. 104). For a different, but not necessary conflicting, interpretation, see Sedley 1998.  
55 Cf. De lib. dic., fr. 45: “…we shall admonish others with great confidence, both now and when those {of us} who 
have become offshoots of our teachers have become eminent. And the encompassing and most important thing is, 
we shall obey Epicurus, according to whom we have chosen to live….” 
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ble to work out with precision each and every detail of what we have written on nature and who 
lack the ability to work through the longer books I [i.e., Epicurus] have composed” (Ep. Hdt. 35). 
His audience recognizes him as “the one guide of right speech and [action]” (De lib. dic., 40.6-8) 
and does not need to be “convinced” that the soul is mortal, or that all good and bad lies in sense-
perception. They already accept as true Epicurus’ theories concerning various physical phenom-
ena. What his audience needs, at this point, is to commit firmly to memory those theories in or-
der to achieve peace of mind. And this particular type of packaging is, it seems to me, maximally 
effective for his intended audience. 
 The letter to Menoeceus opens and closes with an emphasis on practice (122.1: µελλέτω, 
13: πράττοµεν, 123.1: πρᾶττε καὶ µελέτα, 135.5: µελέτα). It is not enough to hear the arguments 
that support the central tenets of Epicureanism once. One must rehearse again and again these 
arguments, committing them firmly to memory. Complicated and intricate arguments, while not 
impossible to learn and rehearse repeatedly, are simply not as effective as short and concise ar-
guments that conclude the same point. At this point in their therapy, Epicurus’ audience requires 
a treatment that allows them to rehearse time and again those arguments that support the central 
tenets, committing them firmly to memory, so as to “never be disturbed either when awake or in 
sleep, and…live as a god among men” (Ep. Men. 135). The arguments contained in Epicurus’ 
letter to Menoeceus are ideal for this purpose.  
The dictum expressed in KD 2 also appears in Lucretius at DRN 3.832-42: 
et velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri, ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis, omnia 
cum belli trepido concussa tumultu horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris, in dubioque fuere 
utrorum ad regna cadendum omnibus humanis esset terraque marique, sic, ubi non ermius, cum 
corporis atque animai discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti, scilicet haud nobis quicuam, 
qui non erimus tum, accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere, non si terra mari miscebitur et 
mare caelo. 
 
And as in time past we felt no distress when the advancing Punic hosts were threatening Rome on 
every side, when the whole earth, rocked by the terrifying tumult of war, shudderingly quaked 
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beneath the coasts of high heaven, while the entire human race was doubtful into whose posses-
sion the sovereignty of the land and the sea was destined to fall; so, when we are no more, when 
body and soul, upon whose union our being depends, are divorced, you may be sure that nothing 
at all will have the power to affect us or awaken sensation in us, who shall not then exist—not 
even if the earth be confounded with the sea, and the sea with the sky. 
 
Lucretius’ presentation of KD 2 is drastically different from Epicurus’ in his letter to Menoeceus. 
It is neither simple nor straightforward, but couched in poetic imagery. Because of this, many 
commentators have interpreted Lucretius’ argument as one related to, but not identical with, the 
arguments of Ep. Men. 124 and KD 2. Lucretius’ target is not our fear of pain once we are dead, 
but according to some the fear that we will someday die. In essence, Lucretius’ target is our fear 
of our own mortality. However, this interpretation does not agree with Lucretius’ Latin. James 
Warren has argued, and correctly I think, that the tense of Lucretius’ verbs indicate that what we 
are asked to reflect on is not our present attitude towards our pre-natal non-existence, and then 
adopt a similar attitude towards our eventual post-mortem non-existence. Rather, we are to re-
flect on that particular moment in history, when we did not yet exist, and recognize that at the 
time we felt nothing. And therefore when we are dead and no longer exist, “now that the nature 
of the mind is understood to be mortal” (DRN 3.830-31), our post-mortem non-existence will be 
nothing to us because we will not feel anything. Thus, in this passage Lucretius advances the 
same claim found in Ep. Men. 124 and KD 2.56 
 Although Lucretius’ poem is addressed to Memmius, like Epicurus’ letters it too is in-
tended for a broader audience. Gaius Memmius was a notable Roman politician. More important 
than his social status, though, are his vices; a strong desire for fame, which lead to his being ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For Warren’s full defense of this view (summarized here) see Warren 2004, pp. 57-68. Warren also notes at the 
outset of his discussion, “We may in any case be suspicious of the ascription of any major innovations to Lucretius 
if we accept the general conclusion of Sedley 1998 that Lucretius works solely with Epicurus’ On Nature as his 
philosophical source. The overall impression is that Lucretius was reluctant to alter in any significant way Epicurus’ 
own original argumentation” (2004, 57, n. 1).  
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iled, laziness, and boundless erotic desire.57 The presence of these character flaws has caused 
some scholars to question whether Gaius Memmius is the proper addressee of Lucretius’ poem. 
However it is a person with such deep flaws that is most in need of Epicurus’ philosophy, and 
therefore a fitting addressee. But Memmius is not alone. Many people are afflicted with similar 
diseases—lust, greed, envy, irascibility, and so forth. And so, even though Lucretius addresses 
Memmius directly, he is also addressing a larger audience composed of Roman men and women 
who are not yet committed Epicureans.58 
 But Lucretius’ audience will not be cured by the succinct arguments found in Epicurus’ 
letters. Those arguments are too blunt and harsh for non-dedicatees of Epicureanism, and Lucre-
tius is readily aware of this fact. “Since this philosophy of ours often appears somewhat off-
putting to those who have not experienced it, and most people recoil back from it, I have pre-
ferred to expound it to you in harmonious Pierian poetry” (DRN 1.945-47). Thus it is not 
straightforward prose, but pleasing poetry composed in the same meter as the epics of Homer 
and Hesiod,59 that is required for those Roman men and women who are put off by Epicurus’ 
philosophy. And although wide awake to the difficulties of illuminating Epicurus’ discoveries in 
Latin verse, largely to due to the inadequacy of the Latin language, Lucretius recognizes his task 
as too important. For it is only by studying nature, through either prose or poetry (depending on 
one’s present condition), that the terrifying darkness that enshrouds the mind may be dispelled.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Memmius committed adultery with the wives of two of his political rivals, Marcus and Lucius Lucullus, which 
further complicated his political career. For more on Memmius and Lucretius’ relation to him, see Smith 2001, xiii-
viii.  
58 Cf. DRN 3.978-1023. 
59 De Rerum Natura is written in dactylic hexameter—the same meter in which Homer and Hesiod wrote their epics, 
the meter used by the philosopher-poets Parmenides and Empedocles, and Hellenistic poets Apollonius and Nican-
der. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the meter of Lucretius’ poem made it more attractive to its audience, 
and consequently its arguments more persuasive. 
60 DRN 1.137-49. 
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 Returning to DRN 3.832-42, then, although Lucretius’ audience is Roman men and wom-
en who are non-dedicatees of Epicureanism, this does not preclude the possibility that Lucretius 
relies on their familiarity with of the doctrines of Epicurean atomism and sense-perception in or-
der to demonstrate that “death is nothing to us.” In the first two books of De Rerum Natura, Lu-
cretius lays out the basic principles of atomism (DRN 1.146-634) and describes the great variety 
of atomic shapes and their effects (DRN 2.333-729). Moreover, before arriving at the passage in 
question, Lucretius spends the beginning of Book III explaining the nature and composition of 
the soul (DRN 3.94-416) and demonstrates that the soul is subject to both birth and death (DRN 
3.417-829). Having established that death is annihilation,61 the passage in question uses the Pu-
nic Wars in order to demonstrate vividly its consequences. It is an illustration of the fact that 
death is nothing to us, because death is annihilation. The second Punic War was troubling for the 
city of Rome. Hannibal’s army crossed the Alps and delivered several crushing defeats to the 
Roman army. As the audience remembers this event they are likely filled with fear, which is 
heightened by Lucretius’ poetic language. But at that time they were unable to perceive anything, 
for the atoms that compose our body and soul were “strayed and scattered in all directions, far 
away from sensation” (DRN 3.861-62). And when we die those atoms that compose our body 
and soul will stray and scatter once again, the possibility of perception impossible, and so too 
that anything can be either good or bad. 
The last occurrence of the dictum that I will discuss is found at DRN 3.972-75: 
respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante. hoc 
igitur speculum nobis natura futuri temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram. 
 
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before our birth were 
nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Lucretius’ remark just prior to the symmetry argument makes this clear: “Death, then, is nothing to us and does 
not affect us in the least now that the nature of the mind is understood to be mortal” (DRN 3.830-31). 
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Some scholars have also contended that the conclusion of the argument contained within this 
passage is similar to, but not identical with, that of KD 2. Just as with DRN 3.832-42, they assert 
that Lucretius’ target here is the fear of mortality and not the fear of death itself. But again, the 
tenses of the verbs do not square with such an interpretation. Lucretius is not claiming that our 
pre-natal non-existence has been nothing to us, but rather that our pre-natal non-existence was 
nothing to us. Indeed, “if Lucretius wished to make clear that he is talking about it presently be-
ing the case that our pre-natal non-existence causes us no distress, then he could have done so 
easily by writing the present tense of the same verb (sit).”62 Thus, here too the conclusion is the 
same as that of KD 2, Ep. Men.124, and DRN 3.832-42; that “death is nothing to us.”  
We may wonder, though, why Lucretius provides his audience with another argument 
with the same conclusion as the one given just one hundred and thirty lines earlier. The answer is 
obvious once we remember the purpose of the arguments of Epicurus’ letters. The former argu-
ment and this latter argument are intended to work alongside one another.63 DRN 3.832-42 is de-
signed by Lucretius to demonstrate the consequences of the fact that death is annihilation. But as 
was indicated earlier, it is not enough to hear the arguments that support the central tenets of Ep-
icureanism once. The arguments must be rehearsed time and again, the beliefs reinforced through 
repetition as Epicurus advises. Therefore, instead of leaving his audience with a lengthy passage 
to recall time and again, Lucretius provides his audience with a simple mental exercise they can 
perform throughout the day. In this way, Lucretius maintains his commitment to espousing Epi-
curus’ philosophy in the harmonious language of the Muses, and at the same time packages one 
of Epicureanism’s central tenets in such a way as to be effective for his audience. 
III.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Warren 2004, 66. 
63 Warren 2004, 68, n. 13 notes that Bailey, in his 1947 commentary on Lucretius’ poem, writes that this section 
reinforces the argument given at 3.832ff.. 
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The discussion of some of Epicurus and Lucretius’ arguments above demonstrates suffi-
ciently that the patient-relativity thesis applies to the arguments of both Greek and Roman Epicu-
reans. In this final section, I close with an examination of two reasons for fearing death treated 
by Philodemus in his On Death. My discussion mirrors largely that of the previous section—
identifying Philodemus’ intended audience, explaining why Philodemus addresses them in the 
manner that he does, and then illuminating how that makes his arguments more therapeutically 
effective. At times my discussion will be quite complex, for Philodemus displays a more robust 
understanding of how vices, vicious dispositions, and harmful emotions are interrelated. As a 
result, when Philodemus attempts to treat his audience’s fear of death, he must treat the concomi-
tant beliefs as well. 
Philodemus’ intended audience in On Death differs in an important way from the intend-
ed audiences of Lucretius’ epic and Epicurus’ letters. Perhaps due to Philodemus’ interest in, and 
consequently robust understanding of, human psychology and its complexities, he attempts to 
treat a wide range of reasons for fearing one’s eventual death. In the light of this and other strik-
ing features of the treatise—notably its sympathetic tone and surprising concessions—David 
Armstrong has argued, and I think correctly, that Philodemus’ intended audience is a mixed au-
dience consisting of men and women, Epicurean faithful and philosophers from other sects, as 
well as laypersons.64 
The fears of death at sea, or of not dying an honorable death on the battlefield, are likely 
to be held by non-philosophers, whereas the fear of death at unjust condemnation, or of dying 
before one has progressed far enough in philosophy to attain εὐδαιµονία, are more likely to be 
held by philosophers of all sects. In addition, Philodemus praises Plato alongside Epicurus (De 
Mort., cols. XXX.37-XXXI.1), commends Socrates, Zeno of Elea, and Anaxarchus (ibid., col. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Armstrong 2004. 
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XXXV.31-32),65 and speaks positively of the Homeric hero Palamedes and Alexander’s friend 
Callisthenes (ibid., col. XXXIV.3-4). Finally, at two different places in the treatise Philodemus is 
unusually liberal. Instead of espousing atomism when combatting the fear of the body losing its 
beauty and physique in death, he writes, 
…and they disregard (the fact) that all men, including those with as good a physique as Milo, be-
come skeletons in a short period of time, and in the end are dissolved into their elementary parti-
cles: and obviously, analogous points to those stated are to be understood also in the case of bad 
complexion and bad appearance in general. (ibid., col. XXX.1-7)66 
 
Instead of mentioning atoms, Philodemus opts for the neutral expression τὰς πρώτας…φύσεις, 
elementary particles. A similar concession occurs two columns later, where the fear in question 
is of the body becoming unearthed after death.  
For who is there who, on considering the matter with a clear head, will suppose that it makes the 
slightest difference, never mind a great one, whether it is above ground or below ground that one 
is unconscious? Or if in the future as a result of some cause someone’s remains are uncovered, (a 
thing) that we know to have occurred frequently, who will consider the non-existent (man) pitia-
ble? Who would not believe that both those who have been laid out for burial and the unburied 
will all be dissolved into whatever he considers (to be their) elements? (ibid., col. XXXII.20-30) 
 
Again Philodemus allows his audience to retain some of their currently held beliefs. The most 
plausible explanation for these and other concessions to the Epicurean doctrine, Philodemus’ 
tone shifting from harsh and unsympathetic to gentle and consoling (discussed below), and the 
presence of non-Epicurean philosophers and mythical heroes, is that On Death is intended for a 
mixed audience. 
The first fear of death I wish to discuss is the fear of death at sea (ibid., cols. XXXII.31 – 
XXXIII.36). The passage is long, but worth reproducing in full. 
Now it is also foolish to be frightened of death at sea rather than of (death) in a pond or river, and 
even to be afraid of that (death) rather than of (death) from unmixed wine. For it [too] is wet, and 
what need is there to argue that it is no worse to be devoured by fishes than by maggots and grubs 
while covered by the earth, or by fire while lying on the earth, at least when the remnant has no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Henry writes that Anaxarchus was a fourth-century philosopher who was crushed to death by Nicocreon, the ty-
rant of Cyprus, in a mortar with iron pestles. See Henry 2009, 83, n. 152 for more information.  
66 All translations of Philodemus’ On Death are from Henry 2009.  
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perception of either the former or the latter? It is also silly to speak in exaggerated fashion of dy-
ing “on the high sea” and “the Libyan (sea)”: for one must be drowned by <three> or four gulps, 
which could happen even in a bathtub. And as for the Odysseus who says “thrice blessed and four 
times are the Danaans who died then in broad Troy in the service of the Atridae: would that I too 
had died thus, but as it is, I was fated to be captured by a baneful death,” surely he was off the 
mark in considering unfortunate those who have died in sea-battles over their fatherland, like 
those who would undergo this fate at Artemisium and Salamis and those (who would undergo it) 
later and after us? For they are no less doing something for future generations to learn about than 
those (who would undergo this fate) in Plataea <and other land-battles>, since the greater number 
even of them have become or will become food for birds and dogs. For what need is there to men-
tion those who put to sea out of the love of learning, or the wise men who sail for the sake of 
friends? On the other hand, it is certainly natural both to criticize and to deem wretched those 
who spend their whole life on the waves through love of profit, and are sometimes plunged into 
the sea as a result, but it is their life that is pitiable, not their death, when they do not exist; while 
for those who sail on essential business, but meet with an adverse fortune, neither (is pitiable), 
especially as death at sea does not necessarily confer more violent sufferings. 
 
Immediately we notice that Philodemus’ tone here is sharp and unsympathetic. Elsewhere Philo-
demus sympathizes with his audience’s φυσικὰ δήγµατα, natural pains, caused by certain fears. 
Some are pained at the thought of dying because they will leave behind someone close to them—
parents, children, or a wife—who ἐν συµφοραῖς ἐσοµένο[υ]ς, will be in dire straits, or καὶ τ[ῶ]ν 
ἀν[αγ]καίων ἐλλείψοντας, will lack even necessities (ibid., col. XXV.2-10). Philodemus says this 
reason produces φυσικώντατον δηγµὸν, a most natural sting, and [δ]α[κ]ρύων προέσεις ἐγείρει 
τῶι νοῦν ἔχοντ[ι], stirs up emissions of tears in the sensible man. Such sympathy is not surprising 
when we remember how even Epicurus himself spoke of friendship and those close to us. “Let us 
share our friends’ suffering not with laments but with thoughtful concern” (VS 66). But as it con-
cerns the fear of death at sea, Philodemus refers to his audience’s pains as κενὸν, foolish or 
empty (the same adjective used to describe vain and empty desires), and µάταιον, silly, accuses 
them of exaggeration (ibid., col. XXXII.6-7: τὸ πυργοῦν...λέγοντα), and demonstrates why their 
presently held beliefs are false, repeating time and again that death is annihilation. I suggest that 
Philodemus uses such a tone for this particular fear because those who hold it are likely layper-
sons, who have not reflected critically on their beliefs. Thus their beliefs must be dispensed with 
quickly and forcefully. From the passage we can distinguish five different beliefs that may sup-
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port the audience’s fear: (1) it is bad to die wet, (2) it is bad to be devoured by fish, (3) it is bad 
to die by drowning, and sailing the sea increases the chance of drowning, (4) death during a sea-
battle is baneful because no one will hear of it, and (5) it is bad to sail the seas seeking to acquire 
great wealth only to die as a result.67  
There are two things worth noting about Philodemus’ counterarguments to these five be-
liefs. First, none of them are without response. While it is true that three or four gulps of water 
are sufficient to drown a person and that this could happen even in a bathtub, this by itself does 
not refute the claim that an unintended dip in the sea increases the possibility of one’s lungs fill-
ing with those three or four gulps of water. And yet it is not necessary for Philodemus’ counter-
arguments be airtight, for his aim is to demonstrate κα[τ]αστρέφειν ἐν θαλά[τ]τηι πόνους 
ἰσχ[υρ]ο[τ]έρους ἐπιφέροντ[ος], “death at sea does not necessarily confer more violent suffer-
ings” (ibid., col. XXXIII.33-36).68 Recognition of this fact brings us to our second point: the ar-
gumentative strategy. Several of the beliefs that support the rationality of the fear of death at sea 
are in fact extensions of the beliefs that support other fears (e.g. fears associated with death on 
land). With Pyrrhonist spirit, Philodemus need only provide counterarguments equal in strength 
to his audience’s beliefs, concluding death at sea is as bad prima facie as death on land. Then he 
can turn his attention to undermining those beliefs that support both fears. The preceding seven 
columns treat fears tied specifically to dying on land: (6) death in a foreign country (cols. 
XXV.37 – XXVII.14), (7) dying while not performing some deed for future generations to learn 
about (cols. XXXII.15 – XXIX.26), (8) the fear of losing one’s beauty and physique when one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Recall that vain and empty desires rise from false beliefs about what is truly good and bad. So, if a person is afraid 
to die at sea, then that fear is the result of a vain and empty desire (e.g. the desire to receive a lavish burial), which in 
turn is supported, perhaps, by either the belief that it is bad to die wet—for it is not part of a lavish burial that one’s 
body should be soaked—or the belief that it is bad to be devoured by fishes—for it is not part of a lavish burial to be 
devoured by fishes, and as a result one’s body severely disfigured. 
68 Philodemus argues for modified versions of this weaker claim elsewhere in On Death. On this point see Tsouna 
2006, 101-3.  
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dies (cols. XXIX.27 – XXX.6), (9) the fear that one will not receive a lavish burial (cols. XXX.7 
– XXXI.29), (10) or that one will not receive a burial at all (cols. XXXI.30 – XXXII.30). Each of 
these sections refute precisely those beliefs that also support the fear of death at sea: (10) and (8) 
with (1) and (2); (7) and (6) with (4); (9) with (5). Thus Philodemus’ treatment here need not be 
thorough or exhaustive, because his approach is systematic. The first task is to demonstrate both 
that certain reasons for fearing death at sea are foolish, and that there is no reason to suppose dy-
ing at sea is worse than dying on land. Then the second task is to refute those beliefs common to 
dying both on land and at sea. Because the preceding seven columns refuted these beliefs, treat-
ing the fear of death at sea requires little work. Thus Philodemus can afford to be short and di-
rect, for the reasons that support the fear of death at sea are extensions of those reasons that sup-
port other fears. 
The second fear of death I wish to discuss is the fear of premature death. Philodemus’ 
treatment of the fear of premature death seems to begin near the top of column XII (the text is 
quite poor in these early columns), and concludes near the end of column XX. Unlike the fear of 
death at sea, the fear of premature death is more robust.69 But like the fear of death at sea, the 
fear of premature death may be supported by a variety of beliefs: (11) additional time affords us 
with the opportunity to acquire additional goods, and the absence of this opportunity is bad, (12) 
a life’s “goodness” is determined by its length, and so long lives are necessarily better than short 
lives, and (13) dying young is intrinsically bad. There is at least one, though possibly there are 
two additional beliefs, with which Philodemus dealt.70 He writes near the top of one column, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Warren lists the fear of premature death as one of the four chief fears of death. The other three are (1) the fear of 
being dead, (2) the fear that one will die, that one’s life is going to end, and (4) the fear of the process of dying. See 
Warren 2004, pp. 1 – 16, and 109 – 159. 
70 In addition to the remark at the beginning of column XVI, column XV seems to deal with a fear related to the 
body’s changing condition. The rest of column XVI seems to continue column XV’s theme, but given the few extant 
lines its topic must be at least slightly different.  
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“For just this reason, the earlier objection concerning those who are in this particular state while 
dying is ridiculous” (ibid., col. XVI.7-9). However, the referent of πρότερον ἔνστηµα, the earlier 
objection, is lost. Because the extant text is still badly damaged at this point, I will not reproduce 
it here. Instead, I will provide a brief summary, and only of the final belief dealt with by 
Philodemus; (14) it is bad to be “snatched away” (col. XVII.34: [ἐ]ξαρπάζεσθαι) in the midst of 
one’s philosophical training while progress is still possible. 
Some of the beliefs that support various fears of death are treated unsympathetically, as 
we saw with the beliefs supporting the fear of death at sea. At one point Philodemus refers to 
these types of beliefs collectively as φλεδών, balderdash. Such a tone is not unique to On Death. 
In On Anger, for instance, after departing from his mock diatribe to address seriously his audi-
ence, Philodemus, expressing his disgust for parents and poets, relatives and philosophers, who 
fail either to treat θύµος, irrational anger, sufficiently (i.e., the Stoics) or to encourage it (i.e., the 
Peripatetics), writes, ἀφ[ί]ηµ[ι] µὲν ῥήτορας καὶ ποιητάς καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην γρυµέαν, “I 
dismiss orators and poets and all such bags of trash” (De Ira, col. XXXI.23-25). However, if 
death is feared because it would remove prematurely the opportunity for further progression in 
philosophy, it is only φυσικὸν, natural, to be νὺττεσθαι, stung.71 The contents of On Death col-
umns XVII – XIX, where this fear is discussed, are not harsh counterarguments or sarcastic jabs, 
but sympathetic consolations. The audience is reminded that even their partial progression is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 For more on “bites” (also referred to as “stings” or “pricks”) in Hellenistic philosophy, in particular Philodemus’ 
conception alongside the Stoic conception, see Tsouna 2007, 44-51. The Epicurean conception may have originated 
with either Zeno or Philodemus, and certainly seems to have been influenced by the Stoic view. Allowing the wise 
man to feel such “bites” is consistent with his also having invulnerable tranquility, as such “bites” are self-contained, 
the result of true judgments about situation, and do not last a long time. Most importantly, they do not undermine the 
fact that, for instance, death is nothing to us. On a superficial level, Epicurean “bites” seem indistinguishable from 
Stoic εὐπάθειαι, good states of feeling. However, Epicurean “bites” are importantly different in at least one respect. 
The Epicurean “bites” are of real emotions, whereas Stoic “bites” are “first movements,” part of a pre-emotional 
state. Moreover, for the Epicurean wise man “bites” will sometimes be severely painful, e.g. when he has been 
greatly harmed, and as a result is “profoundly alienated and hates” (De Ira, col. XLII.2-3). There can be no eupathic 
analogue for this state, because for the Stoic such a strong reaction is never appropriate. 
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meaningful; it gives hope to others that they too can progress in philosophy. And although it 
would be much better for a young man to flourish naturally, that he has tasted some of the fruits 
of Epicurus’ philosophy is still a wonderful thing worthy of gratitude. This life of partial pro-
gress is contrasted with the foolish man, who will never acquire a noteworthy good, not even if 
he should [τ]ὸν Τιθωνοῦ δ[ια]γένητ[αι] χρόνον, “live for as long as time as Tithonus” (De Mort., 
col. XIX.33-34).72 Indeed, it would be better for the foolish man ἐ[κλιπεῖν ὅ]ταν γέ[νη]ται [τὴν] 
ταχίστην, “to die in the quickest way when he is born” (ibid., col. XIX.36-37). Philodemus also 
reassures his audience, “(it is) impossible for a soul capable of receiving a blessed disposition not 
to be immediately of such a kind as to be ballasted with the noteworthy [goods]; and once it has 
tasted the [goods] (that proceed) from philosophy, then it is entirely out of the question that it 
should [not] grasp a wonderful good, so that he departs full of exultation” (ibid., col. XVII.1-
9).73 Finally, the columns contain a few reminders that even though it is presently painful to be 
aware of the fact that one might very well die while still capable of progressing in philosophy, 
should this happen there will be no pain, for there will be µηδεµίαν ἶσχεν τῆ[ς] ἐλλείψεω[ς 
ἐπ]αίσθησιν, “no perception of the deficiency” (ibid., col. XIX.31-33).  
Those who fear dying prematurely for this reason are not in need of sarcastic and blunt 
reproaches—their desires are correctly fixed upon what is truly good. And it is natural to wish to 
live on for a certain amount of time in order to complete one’s philosophical training. This de-
sire, according to Philodemus, is συνγ[ε]νικὰς καὶ φυσικὰ[ς], congenital and natural.74 Thus 
Philodemus’ sympathetic tone and gentle consolations are appropriate for two reasons. First, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Tithonus was a mythical Trojan youth who was granted immortality by Zeus, but not eternal youth. 
73 This passage is prima facie in tension with a later passage: “[but] now the greatest good has been received by 
(him), as he has become wise and lived on for a certain extent of time; and (now that) the journey (is) in progress 
(that is) in accordance with its equality and sameness of form, it is appropriate for (this good) to persist to infinity, if 
it were possible” (col. XIX.3-6, my emphasis). For more on this passage, see Warren 2004, pp. 150-3.   
74 See On Death, col. XIV.2-10. 
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provide his audience with encouragement. Coupled with the story of Pythocles, the famous Epi-
curean youth who made great progress before the age of eighteen, Philodemus reminds his audi-
ence that they too can attain a life worthy of the gods should they obey Epicurus’ instructions. 
Second, the gentle consolations help to further solidify his audience’s faith in the power of phi-
losophy. The comparison of the life of partial philosophical progress, which has already enjoyed 
many worthwhile pleasures, with that of the foolish man, is particularly striking, and emerges 
again in the treatise’s peroration. Such individuals are akin to those addressed by Epicurus in his 
letters; they have already embarked upon the right path, what they now require is encouragement 
and those tools (e.g. short and concise arguments they can rehearse with ease) that will help them 
continue towards a life of peace and contentment.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have argued that the Epicurean approach to psychagogy is a highly adaptable one. 
The recent availability of the treatises of Philodemus of Gadara serve to demonstrate that Epicu-
rean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they are adapted for their intended audiences 
in light of their psychological state so as to be therapeutically effective. Once this is clear, it fol-
lows that when we judge whether the philosophical arguments offered by the Epicureans against 
the fear of death, for instance, achieve their end, we must do so in the light of the audience for 
whom they were intended. Failure to do so will result in not only incorrect judgments about the 
success or failure of a particular philosophical argument or set of arguments, but also neglects an 
important aspect of Epicurean psychagogy; the importance of understanding intimately the audi-
ence’s psychology.  
 Of course, it is true that most criticisms of the Epicurean’s arguments against the fear of 
death are concerned with their cogency, and not their therapeutic effectiveness. One may certain-
ly approach Epicurean philosophical arguments in this way—throwing them into a vacuum, and 
evaluating their clarity, consistency, and cogency. But such an approach is not only uninterest-
ing; it is also deeply flawed. As we have seen, the norms of rational discourse, just like every-
thing else outside of pleasure and pain, are valued instrumentally by the Epicureans; only insofar 
as they contribute to the therapeutic effectiveness of a particular philosophical argument or set of 
arguments for their intended audience. Thus, to criticize the Epicurean’s arguments because they 
make use of rhetorical or poetic language, or fail to address potential counterexamples that un-
dermine their plausibility, is to impose on them a standard that their creators would have rejected 
outright.  
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 Philosophy in antiquity was not a purely intellectualist pursuit, but something that every-
one could engage in, and should if they desire a life of tranquility. Μήτε νέος τις ὤν µελλέτω 
φιλοσοφεῖν, µήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε 
πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον, “Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young 
nor weary of it when old. For no one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul” (Ep. 
Men. 122). This message is often lost among contemporary philosophers, and regrettably so. The 
present discussion has been a small attempt to remind philosophers of what they have forgotten, 
and to lead them in the right direction. 
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